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The Facebook President: Oil, Citizenship, and the Social Mediation of Politics in 
Nigeria 
On June 28, 2010, Nigerian President Jonathan announced that he had set up a Facebook 
page. Within a few days, his first post garnered 1,344 likes and more than 2,139 comments. 
This article examines how Nigerians use social media to interact with the state. It asks: How 
does social media facilitate conversations on what constitutes a national resource? How is 
social media creating citizens who are simultaneously anonymous and visible? It suggests 
that Facebook and other sites on which Jonathan established online presences were 
constructed as political spaces to interact with the youth of Nigeria, molding that 
constituency into loyal social media citizens ready to align with his aspirations. It also 
describes social media as sites on which the politics of claim-making produce the social 
mediation of oil as a commonwealth in Nigeria. The use of the term “social media citizens” 
is anchored in the fluidity of citizenship. Jonathan’s use of Facebook as both public and 
political spaces elevated the site to a national forum on a resource whose distribution must 
benefit all Nigerians: oil. The article suggests further that social media can serve as a site on 
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which social media citizens can critique how the state manages and distributes oil. 
[Facebook, oil, citizenship, soccer, state, governance] 
 
In May 2010, Nigerian President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan made a speech in which 
he promised to set up a Facebook page: 
I am happy that the discourse and demand for free and fair elections are a 
nationwide current that cannot be stopped. Once again, I commit myself to 
working with all Nigerians, especially the youths to bring the sad days of 
electoral malfeasance to an end. As part of my contribution to this debate I 
will set up a Facebook account that will focus primarily on the exchange of 
ideas. (Ogbu 2010) 
 
Then, on June 28, 2010, Jonathan announced that he had set up his Facebook page. His post 
stated, inter alia:  
Today, in fulfillment of the promise I made at the 26th convocation of the 
University of Port Harcourt on Saturday, 15 May 2010, I have created a 
Facebook fan page to interact with Nigerians. As I said on that day, there is an 
unchallengeable power of good in the Nigerian nation and her youth and 
through this medium I want Nigerians to give me the privilege of relating with 
them without the trappings of office.
1
  
 
Jonathan, a minority of Ijaw heritage from the Niger Delta region, was the first person from a 
minority ethnic group to be elected president in Nigeria, a nation that is ethnically diverse but 
also rife with ethnic conflict. President Umar Musa Yar‘dua was elected in in 2007 to a term 
of four years, but he died in 2010, after which then-Vice President Jonathan came into office. 
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Considering the rancor that followed Jonathan‘s sudden elevation from vice president to 
president in a state deeply divided on ethnic lines, it is not surprising that Jonathan decided to 
make the support and mobilization of youths the focal point of his new presidency. By 
focusing on youth to become social media warriors, he envisaged support for his presidency 
from that critical segment of the Nigerian society. This focus on social media and youth 
culture was particularly important during the succession debate immediately after the death of 
Yar‘dua. 
 
Within a few days of announcing his Facebook page, Jonathan‘s first post garnered more than 
1,340 likes and 2,135 comments. By October that year, he had ―more Facebook fans than the 
combined tally of British Prime Minister David Cameron, German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, and South African head of state Jacob Zuma.‖2 The likes and comments were an 
indication of potential interpersonal interactions between the president and his largest 
constituency: youths. In Nigeria, the category ―youth‖ is very fluid, as people even aged up to 
mid-fifties might still refer to themselves as youths (Adunbi 2015). It was, therefore, not 
surprising for Jonathan to explicitly court those who categorized themselves as Internet-savvy 
youths. Many of those comments commended Jonathan for creating the page; soon thereafter, 
―friending‖ the president on Facebook became a source of pride for what I term the ―social 
media citizens‖ of the nation-state of Nigeria.  
 
A few months into his presidency, however, that same Facebook page became a site for the 
condemnation of policies that many of these social media citizens considered inimical to the 
progress of Nigeria. This article addresses the shift from commendation to condemnation 
within the social mediation of politics in Nigeria. Building on the increasing research on the 
interface of social media with politics (see, e.g., Bernal 2006; Gerbaudo 2012, Howard et al. 
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2011; Pype 2016; Shirky 2011; Turner 2008), I examine how Nigerians use the Facebook 
platform in unique ways to navigate the boundaries between those with political power and 
those without. I further demonstrate how these citizens of the oil-rich nation of Nigeria use 
social media not only to assert their ownership of natural resources such as oil but also to 
mediate political belonging in Nigeria. More importantly, I show how Facebook and other 
social media platforms serve as political spaces for citizens (e.g., Bernal 2006; Fattal 2012; 
Pype 2016; Soysal 2012; Stein 2012; Turner 2008), giving them outlets to interrogate the 
state‘s policy pronouncements, construct political alliances, and structure new social and 
political relationships. Therefore, I ask: How are Nigerians using social media to discuss 
issues with the state, ranging from the popular (e.g., soccer) to the more serious and 
controversial (e.g., oil and natural resources)? How is social media facilitating conversations 
on who owns national resources, and how are those conversations socially mediated? A form 
of visible concealment, I argue, shapes communication with the state—that is, citizens‘ views 
are visible via their posts on social media networking sites—but their identities can remain 
anonymous. Anonymity can be achieved both by using pseudonyms and by the ability to 
make these claims from the comfort and privacy of their smartphones, as opposed to speaking 
aloud in a public forum. This article is divided into four sections. 
 
The first section is the methodology used to collect the social media data. The next section 
explores the circumstances that led to the emergence of Jonathan as the president of Nigeria. 
The circumstances of his emergence, I argue, helped shape the production of ―the Facebook 
president‖ and the construction of social media citizens. In the following section, I interrogate 
the aftermath of various interactions that accompanied setting up a Facebook page by the 
president. This section particularly focuses on the president‘s intentionality of using 
Facebook as a site for the construction and production of loyal ―friends.‖ The section after 
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that includes a discussion of poverty, soccer, and other aspects of the common Nigerian 
experience, which is intended to portray the president as ―one of the people.‖ The final 
section examines how social media citizens interacted with the discourse on oil in the public 
sphere. The section asks: How is it that social media sites, particularly Facebook, have 
become battlegrounds for contestations over ownership of oil resources in Nigeria? It also 
focuses on social media and ownership claims over oil resources by examining how 
Facebook has become a space for questioning certain state oil policies that are considered 
inimical to the interest of Nigerian social media citizens as well as Nigerians in general. I 
argue that this mode of questioning is anchored on the claim that oil resources do not belong 
to the state; rather, oil is seen as a commonwealth that must be used for the good of social 
media citizens and the entire country.  
 
Methodology 
The data for this research was collected from three sources. First, in fall 2012, I set up 
Facebook and a Twitter accounts, both with the name GoverningNaijaOil. These accounts 
collect articles and opinions on oil and other governance issues; there are more than four 
hundred ―friends‖ and ―followers,‖ most of whom claim to be Nigerians or interested in 
Nigeria. Second, between fall 2012 and summer 2015, three research assistants and I 
monitored the daily conversations on Jonathan‘s Facebook page. The comments and 
conversations from his Facebook page and GoverningNaijaOil page were extracted, 
processed, and analyzed. Third, popular Internet destinations for many Nigerians, such as 
saharareporters.com, Nairaland.com, Nigeriavillagesquare.com, and Nigeriaworld.com, were 
diligently followed during this period, and comments and conversations were extracted for 
analysis. It should be noted that this methodology, like any ethnographic method, carries 
several limitations. Most notably, Internet-published posts and comments lack the personal 
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verification, background information, and other context cues available through traditional 
participant observation. However, the data collected over this three-year period provide a lens 
through which to gauge the ways in which many Nigerians who use social media engage with 
the state. For example, when we found that the president has common friends with 
GoverningNaijaOil, in some cases I was able to follow up with questions seeking 
clarifications on comments and conversations. Thus, what follows is the outcome of more 
than three years of using Facebook to observe interactions about spaces of politics in Nigeria. 
 
The Accidental President: Reconfiguring the Space of the State and Social Media 
On May 5, 2010, President Umaru Musa Yar'adua died after a long battle with what was said 
to be kidney disease and a heart problem.
3
 Though he was in and out of the hospital for most 
of his presidency, no official statement came from Aso Rock, Nigeria‘s seat of power, 
indicating he was ill. Some Nigerians in the diaspora, however, managed to set up sections in 
blogs, such as on saharareporters.com, from which they published details of the president‘s 
illness. For example, in a report dated November 22, 2009, saharareporters.com detailed 
Yar‘adua‘s illness and suggested that he was going to be flown to Saudi Arabia that night.4 
The president was indeed flown to a hospital in Jeddah and did not return to Nigeria until 
February 2010. At that time, there was also a widespread belief that Yar‘adua‘s own kitchen 
cabinet—a group of a few of his loyalists that included his wife, Mrs. Yar‘adua—was 
exercising control over state affairs, not Vice President Jonathan, as required by the 
constitution. The secrecy surrounding the president‘s illness, combined with this rumor, 
almost plunged the Nigerian state into a constitutional crisis.
5
 This perceived emergency led 
to the formation of the Save Nigeria Group (SNG), an organization led by a Pentecostal 
pastor, Tunde Bakare, who campaigned for the restoration of Nigeria to what he called 
―constitutional order.‖  
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SNG members were seasoned political activists who had participated in the campaign, 
between 1983 and 1999, for the termination of military rule in Nigeria. They put their 
experience to use heralding a campaign to install Jonathan as acting president in Yar‘adua‘s 
absence. In one of its first public statements in January 2010, the group stated:  
The uncertainty in Nigeria has reached unprecedented levels and has led to 
demonstrations all over Nigeria and calls by pre-eminent Nigerian statesmen, 
including three former heads of state, and the International Community for 
President Yar‘adua to obey the constitution and transfer power to his deputy 
until such a time as he is able to return to his duties … We have received with 
relief and commend the resolution of the Senate of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria calling on President Yar‘adua to hand over power to his deputy as 
prescribed by the constitution, though we believe they could have acted much 
earlier and farther than they have gone.
6
  
 
The campaign to make Jonathan acting president was extremely rigorous on social media. 
The SNG set up a Facebook fan page on which interested Nigerians could post comments 
identifying with the group‘s campaign. Other online spaces, such as the websites mentioned 
earlier, also set up various discussion forums for more intense debates. Significantly, many of 
the participants in these debates were young Nigerians who had only recently gained access 
to the Internet through the exponential rise in smartphone usage in the country (Kay and 
Spillane 2013). Through these debates, young Nigerians discovered the potential of social 
media to be used as a tool for campaigning on political issues; in this case, the restoration of 
constitutional order. Many Nigerians, particularly activist groups, fervently argued on social 
media that Jonathan be recognized as president based on the stipulation of the 1999 
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Constitution, which states that in the absence of the president, the vice president must be 
sworn in as the substantive president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
7
 In February 2010, 
Nigerians‘ campaign for constitutional order was rewarded: Jonathan was installed as the 
acting president and, upon the demise of Yar‘adua a few weeks later, Jonathan became the 
youngest and most educated president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. His subsequent 
victory in the 2011 presidential election transformed him from an accidental president into an 
elected president, whose youthfulness and education endeared him to many young 
Nigerians.
8
 As noted above, this youthfulness was shown in his launching and active use of 
Facebook as a form of engagement with the Nigerian public (Adunbi 2011).  
 
Engaging the Facebook President 
Jonathan‘s Facebook page allowed him to tap into his political capital—the vast support he 
had from Nigerians, especially youths—while the uproar over who would succeed Yar‘adua 
was going on. A product of the ruling elite, Jonathan reimagined himself as a champion of the 
youths with an unparalleled presence on social media. In doing so, Jonathan facilitated 
regular interaction with these youths, who are considered to be the majority of the population 
in Nigeria and an important constituency (Sommers 2011). The CIA World Factbook 
suggests that of the estimated 180 million population of Nigeria, 62.4 percent are in the age 
range of 0–24 years, 30 percent are in the range of 25–55 years, and 3 percent are 65 and 
older.
9
 Internet usage is largely dominated by the youths in Nigeria. The country has one of 
the fastest growing Internet usages in the world, moving from 200,000 Internet users in the 
year 2000, to more than 97 million users by the end of June 2015.
10
 Jonathan hoped to 
cultivate this significant population and harness them for political reasons; his creation and 
use of the Facebook page thus enabled him to mimic the rise of Internet use in young 
Nigerians and portray himself as one of them.  
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One indication of Jonathan‘s ―belonging‖ to the youth category was the initial comments 
posted by his Facebook fan page shortly after it was activated. Most of the posts, especially in 
the first few days, tended to consist of brief, welcoming, and congratulatory messages. Users 
seemed to want to show their approval of his decision to join Facebook (―Well done your 
excellency!!!‖ or ―Congratulations! Thank you Mr. President,‖ or ―Welcome to FB Mr. 
President!‖). Most expressed appreciation for what they saw as Jonathan opening a ―direct‖ 
line of communication, hailing the move as unprecedented, democratic, and modern. In fact, 
a number of users compared him to U.S. President Obama, and took this move as proof that 
the president and Nigeria were entering a new, more up-to-date era. Many users commented 
that this would help get the youth involved in governance, and many young users welcomed 
or thanked Jonathan for joining ―on behalf‖ of the youth. These comments were largely 
directed at the president himself, rarely acknowledging or responding to other users‘ 
comments. As time passed, longer messages appeared, some a few paragraphs long, detailing 
what each user thought was the most important issue for the president to work on. Some 
invited the president to contact them for individual discussions, publicly leaving their e-mails, 
phone numbers, or even home addresses. Through constant interaction with the president on 
social media, many participants were transformed into social media citizens. 
 
My use of the term ―social media citizens‖ is anchored in the fluidity of citizenship. To 
understand the connections among social media, citizenship, and ownership of national 
resources, I first examine how the concept of citizenship has shifted from being in the 
purview of the state to being a cultural construct. Many argue that citizenship is no longer a 
prerequisite for state membership (see, e.g., Clarke 2004, 2013; Hindess 2002, 2004, 2005). 
Contemporary literature on citizenship critically interrogates the shift in citizenship discourse 
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from being a derivative of state regulatory bodies to being a flexible category in the age of 
transnational emigration patterns (see, e.g., Clarke 2004, 2007, 2013; Hindess 2002, 2004, 
2005; Ong 1996, 1999; Rosaldo 1994, 2003). Ong (1999, 6), for example, calls this flexible 
citizenship, a form of citizenship that is at the intersection of ―cultural logics of capitalist 
accumulation, travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and 
opportunistically to changing political–economic conditions.‖ These conditions result in 
certain migratory practices that prioritize the acquisition of different citizenships. For 
example, acquisition of nation-state citizenship is considered to be more beneficial than 
transnational citizenship in competitive global economic practices because of the privileges 
attached to it—privileges such as the use of travel documents issued by the nation-state. 
Hindess (2002, 242) invites a critical thinking of the shift from state citizenship based on 
civil, political, and social rights to a much more transformative citizenship that encompasses 
―a supranational governmental regime in which the system of states, international agencies 
and multinational corporations all play a fundamental role.‖ 
 
While Ong and Hindess problematize citizenship practices that are anchored on changing 
global economic and political climate, Clarke (2004, 2012) suggests that cultural practices 
and citizenship are interwoven and interconnected. To Clarke (2004, 2007, 2013), citizenship 
is no longer an exclusive purview of the state; the logics of cultural practices also suggest that 
cultural citizenship is becoming more and more de-territorialized. She urges distinguishing 
between ―a more formalistic notion of citizenship that is managed by the state and a more 
cultural notion of citizenship that invokes a range of factors that span racial, ethnic, linguistic 
and geographical forms‖ (Clarke 2013, 467). In applying the same logic of changing 
practices around notions of citizenship, I propose that an engagement with the state by social 
media actors is a form of citizenship, in which proficiency in the art of social media 
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networking becomes a marker of gaining membership in the realm of social mediation of 
discourses about the state. The language of social media—the ability to write while 
minimizing the use of words, to convey a set of meanings that can be decoded by other 
practitioners of social media—becomes one of the major signifiers of citizenship in the social 
media world. Some examples of these forms of citizenship claims can be seen in the 
comments (highlighted above) that welcomed President Jonathan to Facebook when he 
launched his page in 2010. While some of the comments attempted to introduce Jonathan to 
acceptable ways of gaining membership by mastering social media language, others scolded 
those users who posted lengthy comments, accusing them of being too grammatical and 
saying that such comments are meant for academic and not social media platforms. These 
displays of ―public intimacy‖ (Soysal 2010, 375)—that is, ―shared, discursive, and 
performative spaces of public engagement—rather than the private spaces of the cultural 
kind‖ structure such spaces. Within them, ―networked publics‖ (Boyd 2010; Boyd and 
Ellison 2007) are formed, in which issues of state policy directions are discussed and 
negotiated in the networked public sphere (Baym and Boyd 2012; Habermas 1991, 2006; 
Shklovski and Valtysson 2012). Immersion in issues of state policies through social media 
interactions helped cement the notion of belonging into a particular networked public 
sphere—the social media space—where Nigerians who traverse these spaces consider 
themselves ―experts‖ of the social platform and ―owners‖ of the spatial mediation of politics.  
 
Many of the messages of welcome aimed at Jonathan, interestingly, show that the Nigerian 
users felt a kind of ownership of this networked public web space. They saw themselves as 
the ―experts‖—longtime residents of the Facebook forum that the president was now 
entering. In a sense, the president was not only ―coming down to [citizens‘] level‖11 but also 
entering a realm where ―the people‖ saw themselves as more knowledgeable than the 
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president. This teaching or authoritative attitude was seen in some comments, such as the 
person who explained Facebook‘s abbreviation: ―Welcome Mr. President to FB 
(Facebook).‖12 Others warned the president of the potential pitfalls of this web space. For 
example, someone cautioned, ―One advice Mr President, facebook is addictive.‖13 Some also 
warned about trolls or the potential lack of Facebook etiquette: ―Some may be rude but pls 
ignore and work right.‖14 What these various comments show is perhaps an unconscious role 
reversal, in which the ―ordinary citizens‖ were better placed to lead the president.  
 
Some comments expressed a certain amount of skepticism, arguing that the president would 
not have the time to read and respond to all of the comments. The users did not seem to doubt 
his willingness to do so; rather, they seemed to doubt that he understood just how much time 
Facebook can take; hence, the proposition that it can be addictive. A few users also expressed 
doubt that the president himself was really the person posting and responding. The true 
identity of whoever posted on the behalf of the president seemed unimportant to many of the 
people that I interacted with on Facebook; nevertheless, it is important to note that Jonathan 
did hire a special assistant of New Media to set up his various social media platforms. The 
assistant, Reno Omokri, was a political consultant who had worked as the vice president for 
Africa, Joe Trippi and Associates, a political consulting group in the United States, before 
making a transition to work for the president of Nigeria. To many commenters, having such a 
special assistant was an acknowledgement of the importance Jonathan attached to social 
media and the value of those who participate in crafting conversations on the platform. While 
it may be assumed that Facebook is a democratic and effective way for politicians to 
communicate with ordinary citizens, some users also critiqued this idea. They pointed out 
that Facebook is not a space of equal access: ―Mr. President, how I wish every Nigerians can 
join you on facebook by you making sure there is 24hrs, 7days a week electricity. I don‘t 
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think you should be facebooking or using Internet when other noble Nigerians doesn‘t have 
electricity to keep the refrigerator in their house working.‖15 This particular comment was, of 
course, in reaction to the challenges of electricity distribution in the country. 
 
The rhetorical practices of the comments were quite varied. Some users employed formal 
language and standard grammar, as one would expect to see in a letter or article. Other 
messages seemed quickly and carelessly composed, with typos and fragmented sentences. 
Others ignored the conventions of punctuation and capitalization altogether, relying on the 
abbreviations common in Internet language usage. Nonstandard written English has become 
the norm throughout global social media, but what makes the Nigerian example more 
interesting is the incorporation of Nigerian Pidgin English into the nonstandard written 
English as a medium of communication. This democratizes its usage and creates its own 
unifying convention that sets Nigerian users apart. More importantly, it enables access in 
ways that allow those who are not highly educated to participate in national debates. With a 
51.08 percent literacy rate, according to the United Nations Educational Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, Office of Statistics Estimate, it is clear why Pidgin English remains 
the most accessible language that cuts across ethnic language barriers: every one speaks it in 
addition to their local dialects.
16
 For example, after one user posted a lengthy and elaborately 
composed comment, a few others responded by berating him for his rhetorical choices. One 
user wrote:  
@Mubarak ... I beg ur pardon! ... this is not a platform to flex ur 
grammatical/vocabulary prowlness.... u dont need too much grammar to relate 
with the president...why you come dey write big big grammar? just simple 
communication is wat we require … the man will be too bored reading ur 
theatric essay ... pls dont abuse his page … ok.17  
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The president‘s posts, in general, consisted of commentaries on social, economic, and political matters. 
Sometimes, to show individual engagement, his posts included names of citizens who had commented on 
previous posts. He was just as likely to comment on the television show Big Brother Africa, which Uti 
Nwachukwu, a Nigerian, won in 2010, as he was to mention his inclusion in Time magazine‘s list of the100 
most influential people in the world. When addressing the public, he often used phrases such as ―we must‖ or 
―we should.‖ Jonathan‘s use of ―we‖ was meant to indicate the collective nature of what he was proposing: both 
the state and citizens had roles to play, and ―we are in this together.‖18 To further encourage the idea that the 
state and citizens needed to work together, Jonathan often asked for feedback on current issues. For example, he 
wrote: ―I need your feedback. Has the power situation in your area improved, remained the same or 
deteriorated? Please let me know so I can take your views into consideration in making policy decisions. 
GEJ.‖19 While signing posts with initials is generally outside the Facebook convention, Jonathan used this 
signature to emphasize his personal involvement with the post, distinguishing it from an official staff 
announcement. 
 
After receiving feedback, Jonathan sometimes wrote that he had read everyone‘s comments 
and made a presidential directive to the appropriate government official. In such posts, it was 
clear that the president wanted to interact with, not just speak to, his followers. This 
interaction continued in Jonathan‘s posts on policy issues. Here, he usually talked about an 
action he had taken, the state‘s position on a policy issue, or that he was contemplating an 
action based on things said on Facebook. Such posts were primarily official speeches or 
statements on key policy matters (archived under ―Notes‖ on his Facebook page). 
 
Of course, Jonathan also used his page to respond to criticism. He sometimes made a direct 
reference to a publication or news reports in the national newspapers, such as he did in a post 
that he titled, ―I was grossly misunderstood.‖ In it, he berated those who ―twist words beyond 
intended meaning‖ in ways that are ―unhelpful to public discourse.‖20 Other times, it was 
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unclear where the critique he was responding to had come from. Finally, the president used 
Facebook for general greetings, such as holidays, birthday messages, and commemorative 
occasions, and as proof that he was fulfilling his duties; these included, for example, updates 
on presidential activities, evidence of his appearance at state functions, and other events. All 
of these varying types of posts reflect the different ways that Jonathan tried to engage with 
citizens on Facebook.  
 
As Baym and Boyd (2012, 327) note, ―national and cultural modes of understanding‖ are key 
to deciphering interactions between the state and citizens. Following this logic, I suggest that 
Jonathan‘s online presence demonstrated that such interactions between the state (Jonathan) 
and its citizens (his Facebook friends and Twitter followers) legitimized his attempts to 
promote cultural and national modes of understanding and to cultivate citizens to support 
state policies. Facebook, Twitter, and other sites on which Jonathan, as president, had an 
online presence were, thus, constructed political spaces in which he interacted with the youth 
of Nigeria and molded that constituency into a loyal army of social media citizens, ready to 
align with his aspirations as a politician. In the next sections, I show that this motivation 
invariably conflicted with the expectations of some segments of this constituency. While 
having an imagined audience is fundamental to human communication—that is, people self-
present based on some imagination of whom they will communicate with (Goffman 1959)—
―social media makes it particularly challenging to understand ‗who is out there and when‘ 
and raises the potential for greater misalignment between imagined and actual audiences‖ 
(Baym and Boyd 2012, 323). The reimagining of Nigeria‘s political landscape as a space for 
the production of new imaginaries, dictated by socially mediated communication, became 
crystal clear when Jonathan used Facebook to announce his campaign to run for a new full 
four-year term in 2010.
21
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Social Media, Soccer, and the “People’s” President 
In his long write up reintroducing himself to Nigerians as a candidate of the Peoples 
Democratic Party (PDP), the ruling party, Jonathan placed special emphasis on his poor 
background. He came from an impoverished home, just like many Nigerian youths. On 
Facebook, he wrote: 
Not once did I imagine that a child from Otuoke, a small village in the Niger 
Delta, will one day rise to the position of President of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. I was raised by my mother and father with just enough money to meet 
our daily needs. … I carried my books in my hands but never despaired; no car 
to take me to school but I never despaired. There were days I had only one 
meal but I never despaired. … Didn‘t have power, didn‘t have generators, 
studied with lanterns but I never despaired. In spite of these, I finished 
secondary school, attended the University of Port Harcourt, and now hold a 
doctorate degree. Fellow Nigerians, if I could make it, you too can make it! 
My story is the story of a young Nigerian whose access to education opened 
up vast opportunities that enabled me to attain my present position.
22
  
 
Many ―liked‖ the post, and several commended him for all his perceived achievements. More 
importantly, many of the youths could relate to his ―I had no shoes‖ story, considering 
Nigeria‘s substantial and ongoing socio-economic problems (Adunbi 2015; Apter 2005; 
Ferguson 2002; Smith 2007). After the president published this post about his poor 
background, the fulcrum of many of his subsequent posts centered on youth and used the 
word ―our‖ to build rapport with the people. These two important words—―youth‖ and 
―our‖—framed Jonathan as a leader and a ―people‘s president‖ dedicated to reconfiguring the 
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state in transformative ways. This promised transformation placed the largest and most 
important population of the state—the youths—at the center of policy pronouncements, even 
if those pronouncements were not carried out.  
 
Besides his poor upbringing, Jonathan connected to the people by merging his appeals to both 
national identity and transnational citizenship through engagement with a particular public 
sphere: social media. As Habermas (1991) suggests, the public sphere performs essential 
political functions within a society; in this case, the public sphere in question occurred 
through social media. Citizens connected their national identity (as citizens of Nigeria) to 
their membership of a de-territorialized social media world. The comments welcoming the 
president to the world of Facebook demonstrated both types of performed identities: the local 
(nation-state citizenship) and the global (membership of a global social media). Affordances 
aside, ―national and cultural modes of understanding‖ (327) are also crucial to understanding 
what shapes interactions between people on social networking sites. For example, the 
president‘s use of soccer as a touchstone topic to reach the youth was an indication of his 
knowledge of the ―likes‖ and ―dislikes,‖ to use Facebook terms, of the group he was trying to 
cultivate. The state presented state policies to social media citizens through the networked 
public via social media, and members of the networked public responded to such policies by 
engaging with the state through comments that were sometimes imbued with vituperation.  
 
In cultivating this important segment of society, Jonathan constantly shifted from policy 
pronouncements to everyday and popular culture issues, such as posting his inclusion in Time 
magazine‘s 100 most influential leaders or sharing his thoughts on soccer. Soccer is 
considered the national pastime of Nigeria, and many youths either follow their favorite 
soccer team‘s exploits or simply follow the national team of Nigeria. Posts related to soccer 
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sometimes drew on national pride and the resilience of Nigerian teams when representing the 
Nigerian state at international competitions. For example, in one such post, Jonathan 
discussed a memory from his childhood to highlight what he saw as a strong example of the 
youths‘ resilience and doggedness:  
We must be hopeful about the future. Our history has shown that Nigerians 
have a strong can-do-attitude and are capable of winning even in the face of 
very difficult circumstances. … Some of you may recall the 1989 ―Miracle of 
Damman‖ in Saudi Arabia when our Flying eagles unbelievably came back 
from being 4-0 down against the USSR to equalising and eventually winning 
the game! ... You helped to bring about this democracy and when I say that 
Nigerian youths have in them the stuff that greatness is made of, I know this to 
be true. I will work with you to realise our potential as a great Nation. GEJ.‖23 
 
The constant shift from issues of policy to popular culture provided an avenue for Jonathan to 
present himself as a president who connected with the everyday lived experiences of all 
Nigerians, especially the youths. The popularity of soccer among youths is too substantial to 
be measured and provides a sense of hope throughout the country. A good example is 
Jonathan‘s response to what many considered to be a disastrous outing by the Nigerian 
national soccer team, the Super Eagles, at the 2010 FIFA World Cup.
24
 Many Nigerians had 
expected their national team to do well because the soccer competition was taking place on 
the African continent, but the Super Eagles were eliminated in the first round without 
winning a single match. This loss prompted President Jonathan to dissolve the Nigeria 
Football Federation, the soccer governing body affiliated with FIFA. Predictably, FIFA saw 
Jonathan‘s decision as state interference in soccer affairs and, in response, placed a ban on 
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Nigeria.
25
 FIFA‘s ban, also unsurprisingly, was not well accepted by many Nigerians, and 
they transferred their anger to Jonathan, accusing him of insensitivity to the aspirations of 
many Nigerians. Several comments on the president‘s page heavily criticized him for taking 
an action that incurred the wrath of FIFA. In response, a few days later, Jonathan rescinded 
his decision, and FIFA lifted the ban on Nigeria. In his Facebook post, Jonathan wrote:  
Dear friends, I read your comments and took them into account in the 
government‘s decision to rescind the suspension of Nigeria from International 
Football. … To Suleiman [last name], Nwanze [last name] and Ifade [last 
name] and the hundreds of Nigerians who appealed to me on this page, I have 
listened to your voices and those of others and we must now work together to 
make sure that the NFF and our players do us proud in future events. GEJ.
26
  
 
By mentioning the names of a few of those who commented on his Facebook post, Jonathan 
personalized his political decision and appealed to the sense of personal connection 
associated with social media spaces. Jonathan was able to make the connection by showing 
that he not only watched the World Cup, in which Nigeria performed below expectations, but 
also that he identified with the aspirations of many Nigerian youths who wish their national 
team well. Three names mentioned in his post, Suleiman, Nwanze, and Ifade—names 
associated with the three main ethnic groups (Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba, 
respectively)—also demonstrated that Jonathan wanted to be seen as a president who could 
connect with all Nigerians, whatever their ethnic or religious backgrounds might be. 
 
Jonathan engaged and interacted with youths on many facets of Nigeria life, and these 
exchanges could be be fierce depending on the political, cultural, or policy issue on which the 
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interaction was anchored. A good example of the fierceness of these interactions between 
Jonathan and Nigerians on Facebook and other social media platforms is observable through 
the lens of oil: a valuable and contentious commodity considered to be a commonwealth by 
many Nigerians. As I point out in the next section, a policy pronouncement and its 
implementation on oil was to later shift the attention of Nigerians from commending 
Jonathan to condemning him as president. This shift marked an important transformation in 
Jonathan‘s interaction with social media citizens.  
 
Social Media Citizens and the Commonwealth Called Oil  
The romance between Jonathan and his target constituency—youths—did not last long. Many 
of those who had commended him when he first assumed office as president later became his 
ardent critics, using his Facebook page as a platform to object to his continuation in office. 
An example of this change is seen in the responses to the president‘s attempt to use Facebook 
to position the Nigerian state as an important member of the comity of nations, such as when 
he cited his ability to bring foreign direct investment to Nigeria, evidenced by his ringing of 
the New York Stock Exchange‘s closing bell on September 23, 2013: 
Today, I had the honour of ringing the closing bell at the New York Stock 
Exchange after I had heralded to global captains of industry Nigeria‘s efforts 
in recent times that has made our nation a prime destination for foreign 
investment and one that ensures some of the highest Return on Investments 
(RoI) in the world. This is just the beginning of greater things to come for our 
country and our continent. The foundation of planning which we laid at the 
inception of our administration is being strengthened for greater service 
delivery for our people. GEJ.
27
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This claim, however, was not enough to dissuade social media citizens from seeing his 
administration as a failure. The shift in tone from celebratory to condemnation, I argue, is 
anchored on the notion of natural resources, in this case oil, as a commonwealth owned by 
the Nigerian citizens but perceived to be mismanaged by the Nigerian state. More than 95 
percent of Nigeria‘s annual revenue comes from oil and, because revenue is centralized, all of 
the money goes to the central government (Adunbi 2015; Apter 2005). As a result, it is the 
central government, not the citizens, that decides how the revenue from oil will be spent. 
Many of the comments that followed the NYSE closing bell post mimic several other 
comments monitored over a period of three years—2011 to 2014—all of which made it clear 
that citizens felt that Jonathan‘s spending of the oil revenue was wasteful. Such comments, 
and their subsequent responses, beg the following questions: How did the notion of oil as a 
commonwealth emerge? Why did citizens assume all Nigerians owned oil, situated in the 
Niger Delta? How did social media citizens contest the Nigerian state‘s management of the 
perceived commonwealth? In this last section, I describe social media space as a site in which 
the politics of claim-making produced what I call the social mediation of oil as a 
commonwealth in Nigeria. There is significant literature on oil as an important national 
resource (e.g., Adunbi 2015; Apter 2005; Mitchell 2011; Ross 1999; Shever 2012; Sawyer 
2004; Watts 2007, 2012). For many years, the debate on oil as a national resource has ranged 
from the commodity being a curse for states rich in such resources (Ross 1999), to its fueling 
insurgency in ways that create different claim-making processes within communities rich in 
this resource (Adunbi 2015; Watts 2007, 2012), to the materiality of oil and its capacity to 
limit democratic practices in places such as the Middle East (Mitchell 2011). As Rogers 
(2014) points out, oil is an important commodity to nation-states because of the ways in 
which the commodity shapes politics, for example as petrobarter for the Russian state. My 
interest is to look at other ways in which oil can generate a particular discourse that centers 
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on social mediation of politics in a nation-state. The Nigerian state presents a good example 
of how oil (and its properties) served as a commodity that generated social media interest 
among Nigerians. Thus, oil created spaces in which social media citizens who belonged to a 
particular networked public sphere engaged in the discourses of the use of oil as a 
commonwealth. 
 
The idea of oil as a commonwealth was shaped by social media citizens, who constantly 
engaged with the president through his Facebook page regarding the distribution of oil rents 
in Nigeria. The president‘s ability to use Facebook as both public and political spaces 
elevated the site to a national forum for promoting the idea of a national resource as a 
commonwealth, whose distribution must benefit not only social media citizens but also all 
Nigerians. Moreover, the networked public created from oil-related discussions on social 
media conferred on itself the authenticity of representing the entire nation of Nigeria, 
especially disenfranchised Nigerians. This form of representation was embedded in 
comments that deployed words such as ―our oil‖ to denote oil as a commonwealth of all 
Nigerians. However, oil is legally considered a state property by virtue of the Petroleum Act 
of 1969 and the Land Use Act of 1978 (Adunbi 2015; Apter 2005). 
 
Contestation of the state‘s power over oil emerged with Jonathan‘s decision to withdraw the 
subsidy on local oil consumption, which he announced on January 7, 2012. A few days 
before the announcement, the Nigerian state rolled out a program to deregulate the 
downstream sector of the oil industry, in which the government withdrew the petroleum 
subsidy. This deregulation translated to an increase in the prices of petroleum products such 
as Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) and kerosene, which most Nigerians use for cooking. With 
an increase in gas costs, the price of many staple foods also rose because farmers and market 
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workers depend on PMS for the daily transportation of agricultural produce to the market. 
Social media citizens met this sudden withdrawal of subsidies on petroleum products with 
condemnation. The attacks were mainly directed at the president‘s announcement on 
Facebook that implored all Nigerians to bear with him because he was ―making the right 
choice for a better tomorrow.‖28 The condemnation of the president‘s act was further 
amplified because many Nigerians, particularly those who live in cities such as Lagos, 
Ibadan, and Abuja, travel over the long Christmas and the New Year holiday to celebrate 
with their loved ones in villages and towns. Many Nigerians consider this time as an 
opportunity to reunite with their families and relatives. The president wrote:  
 
This evening, I address you, again, with much concern over an issue that 
borders on the national economy, the oil industry and national progress. As part 
of our efforts to transform the economy and guarantee prosperity for all 
Nigerians, Government, a few days ago, announced further deregulation of the 
downstream petroleum sector. The immediate effect of this has been the 
removal of the subsidy on petrol. ... Since the announcement, there have been 
mixed reactions to the policy. Let me seize this opportunity to assure all 
Nigerians that I feel the pain that you all feel. I personally feel pained to see the 
sharp increase in transport fares and the prices of goods and services. I share 
the anguish of all persons who had travelled out of their stations, who had to 
pay more on the return leg of their journeys.
29
  
 
Even though Jonathan explained his actions by saying that he was trying to minimize the pain 
to Nigerians, many social media citizens saw through this claim that citizens would suffer 
only temporarily as a result of the deregulation. Many questioned the rationale for taking this 
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action because, as mentioned above, they believed oil to be a commonwealth of all Nigerians, 
and it should bring happiness, not pain, to citizens. Jonathan‘s Facebook post generated more 
than 16,000 comments, many of which were on how the oil should be used for the benefit of 
all Nigerians. For Jonathan, deregulating the downstream sector of the economy constituted 
using the oil to benefit everyone. To many social media citizens, however, the removal of oil 
subsidies meant Nigerians were denied the benefits of oil. Some of the comments argued that 
it was not just deregulation but also a conspiracy by Western nations that want to use ―our oil 
money to rebuild their economy.‖30 Here, the person who wrote this post was referring to the 
domination of the oil industry by multinational corporations such as Shell, Chevron, 
ExxonMobil, TotalFinaElf, and Agip, all headquartered in the West (Apter 2005; Adunbi 
2015; Shever 2102). This person urged Jonathan to tell Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo 
Iweala, who had announced her intention to run for president of the World Bank before the 
deregulation announcement, not to use ―our [Nigerians] oil money‖ to help Western nations 
and ―to prepare herself for the world bank presidency because she will never be.‖ While this 
post suggests the existence of a Western conspiracy against Nigeria and Jonathan, other 
commenters suggested that Jonathan was merely sacrificing the happiness of Nigeria to 
satisfy the interest of the ―cabals‖ that controlled the oil sector.31 To the person who wrote 
this post, these cabals encompassed the oil corporations and their Nigerian collaborators who 
―want to take our oil from us,‖ and he argued that the price of oil would not come down until 
the ―international market price falls to $50 per barrel or our refineries work to full capacity.‖ 
He continued: 
The said temporary pains is unrealistic since Mr President will not be able to 
control the Cabals in the oil sector. They will continue to make excess profit 
on Nigerians. GEJ just have to return our subsidy until an alternative source as 
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proposed work efficiently for Nigerians then, the demand for PMS may fall 
which will then force down the price of petrol.
32
 
 
Another commenter believed that the president and his ruling party, the PDP, were colluding 
with said ―oil cabals‖ to impoverish Nigerians by raising the price of the product. She also 
addressed the president personally:  
Mr President, You and your PDP led govt can never be trusted again. Ur 
speech tonight makes no difference becos much more of dat have been 
promised and whre are we today? Why is govt not addressing the issue of our 
own refineries? Who are this cabal and why can't govt charge them for 
corruption? Mr President, do u know how it feels to be living on less than 1usd 
per day ? 70% of Nigerians are poor due to past and present govt corruption. 
Ur excos, ur governors and all those will see it as another avenue of getting 
more money to enrich themselve will only support u on this ur untimely and 
wicked policy. Am divinely advising u Mr President, to reverse the subsidy 
back to 65 or resign honorably.
33
 
 
While many of the commentators addressed the president from their point of view as loyal 
social media citizens who regularly used Facebook to communicate with him, others issued 
long lists of demands on behalf of those Nigerians not on Facebook or on other social media. 
For example, someone posted a list of demands that encapsulated this notion of acting on 
behalf of all Nigerians, and he suggested that he was not acting alone but rather represented 
those Nigerians without access to the Internet. He started his post by, once again, positing 
that oil was a national resource owned by all Nigerians, and that such national resources 
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should not be used to compound the suffering that Nigerians have endured in periods of 
economic crisis: 
I wonder why this government is making Nigerians suffer like this. It is our oil 
and we ought to be getting its benefits but the president would not let us. Why 
should our oil benefit just a few friends of the president? Why would you 
subject the children of Nigeria to suffer because of your friends? Didn‘t you 
tell us when you were running for president that you had no shoes? Now you 
have shoes but do not want others to do the same. Please let our oil benefit all 
of us and I speak for all the people and youths of Nigeria.
34
 
 
This post further suggested that oil, although a critical part of the economy of Nigeria, is at 
the same time a commonwealth that the state is only holding in trust for the populace and, as 
such, should not be subjected to the whims of economic indicators.  
 
On March 28, 2015, only two and a half years after that post, Muhammadu Buhari, a retired 
military general and former military head of state from 1983 to 1985, defeated Jonathan in 
the next election. In the weeks leading up to the election, the social media space was abuzz 
with posts either supporting or opposing Jonathan‘s attempt to win a second term. Early on, 
Jonathan had succeeded in courting the youth through social media, but this same 
demographic was responsible for highlighting what they considered to be the president‘s 
indolence on oil money working for all Nigerians. Thus, the 2015 election proved the 
limitations of the president‘s social media approach: portraying himself as ―one of the 
youths‖ did not qualify him to determine how Nigeria‘s national resource commonwealth 
should be shared among all people.  
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Buhari‘s use of social media is very different in strategy and approach. While Jonathan 
presented himself as directly engaged with the Nigerian people, Buhari presents the opposite 
image. Buhari relies on third-party bloggers and activists to manage his social media 
accounts, including popular Nigerian bloggers and social media activists Japhet Omojuwa
35
 
and Kayode Ogundamisi.
36
 Buhari‘s unofficial online support groups include the President 
Muhammadu Buhari Supporters Club On Facebook; ThisisBuhari, another Facebook page; 
@ThisisBuhari, a Twitter account; and ―I am a Buharist,‖ a Facebook group that has a 
membership of 60,468 with the sole objective ―to promote Buharism and good 
governance.‖37 Buhari‘s strategy seems to be the promotion of a cult following based on his 
perceived integrity as an anti-corruption crusader in a nation reeling from corrupt practices 
(Smith 2007). Buhari appointed Tolu Ogunlesi as special assistant on Digital/New Media; he 
is a two-time winner of the CNN Multichoice African Journalism Award and is a 2015 New 
Media Fellow of the US State Department‘s International Visitor Leadership Program.38 
Ahmad Bashir was appointed as special assistant on Social Media; he is the online editor of 
the Leadership Newspapers, one of the leading newspapers in Nigeria.
39
 Both Ogunlesi and 
Bashir are popular and trendy bloggers, both were ardent supporters of the Buhari for 
President project, and both were instrumental in shaping the debate on the failing presidency 
of the Jonathan administration through social media posts that criticized his handling of the 
economy and oil revenue. While trying to appeal directly to Nigeria‘s youth, Jonathan opened 
himself up to criticism that ultimately proved fatal to his administration. Buhari aims to avoid 
the mistakes of his predecessor by maintaining a strong online presence while also keeping a 
personal distance. 
 
Conclusion 
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The evidence presented here demonstrates how political leaders and citizens can use different 
social media as sites of interaction that shape debates on national policies, popular culture, 
and the distribution of public goods. It also shows that while political leaders might use social 
media platforms as sites for cultivating political support, social media citizens can also take 
control of these platforms and use them to critique how the state manages and distributes 
national treasures, such as oil. In an attempt to galvanize support from those who use social 
media, particularly the youths of a nation-state, politicians can create their own spaces within 
social media—for example, by joining Facebook and allowing all social-media savvy youth 
to ―friend‖ them. This was exactly what President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan wanted when he 
created a Facebook page to discuss state policies, popular culture, and other topics of national 
interest with those who friended him. 
 
Through Facebook, Jonathan sought to personalize his political decisions and take advantage 
of the informal personal interactions that take place within social media spaces. The 
president‘s entry into the world of Facebook, originally aimed at endearing him to youth 
culture, failed in the end to serve the purpose he had envisaged. In fact, his social media 
presence may have played an active role in his political demise, giving citizens a forum 
within which to speak their criticisms to a wide audience of Nigerians. What became clear in 
many of the posts was the fact that his popularity as a ―Facebook president‖ had waned 
drastically. He was no longer the popular president who many social media citizens had 
welcomed into their world with warnings about how addictive Facebook could be. Many of 
those who fought for Jonathan to ascend to the presidency viewed his administration 
optimistically, hoping that he would enact policy changes that would ensure the equitable 
distribution of oil wealth. When that proved to be an uphill battle, Facebook also became a 
platform for the condemnation of many of Jonathan‘s policies. The shift in tone from 
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celebratory to condemnatory, I argue, only emerged because of the ability of many Nigerian 
citizens to engage the state through Facebook, without fear of penalty for their political 
views. The ―visible concealment‖ granted to social media citizens allows them to speak their 
minds in a public setting and spread their criticisms of the government throughout a wide 
audience, while remaining sheltered from political repercussions. Meanwhile, direct 
relationships can be cultivated between the rulers and the ruled. Social media thus represents 
a unique platform for political engagement, one that has been instrumental in shaping 
questions on the place of oil, popular culture, and belonging in Nigerian national politics. 
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